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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 In his appellant’s brief, Chad Lee Williams argued that the district court erred by denying 
his motion to suppress because, among other things, it incorrectly concluded that State v. 
Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911 (Ct. App. 2007), stands for a bright-line rule that the police can detain 
anyone nearby while the officers execute a search or arrest warrant.  In response to that 
argument, the State contends the officers’ actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
This reply addresses that argument only.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Williams’ motion to suppress because the officers 





The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Williams’ Motion To Suppress Because The 
Officers Detained Him For Longer Than Necessary And Then Arrested Him Without Probable 
Cause 
  
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Williams argued that the officers could not lawfully detain 
him simply because he was in the vicinity when the officers arrested Mr. Bellenbrock.  (App. 
Br., pp.9–11.)  Specifically, the district court erred by concluding that State v. Reynolds, 143 
Idaho 911 (Ct. App. 2007), and therefore Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), stand for a 
bright-line rule that the police can detain anyone nearby while they execute a search or arrest 
warrant.  (See App. Br., pp.9–11; Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.5.)  The State has not argued to the 
contrary.  (See Resp. Br., pp.7–13.)  Indeed, some of the cases cited by the State expressly 
conclude as much.  (Resp. Br., p.10; see United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(conducting a reasonableness analysis to determine that officers, while looking for the subject of 
an arrest warrant inside a home, lawfully required a person they found in the home to show his 
hands); State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (stating that “absent authority 
to the contrary [such as Summers], each situation is subject to a necessity determination through 
examination of the totality of the circumstances,” and then considering the totality of the 
circumstances to decide whether law enforcement lawfully detained the defendant during the 
execution of an arrest warrant on a third party) (internal citations omitted); see also Adams v. 
Springmeyer, 17 F. Supp. 3d 478, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (“[B]ecause Summers “grants substantial 
authority to police officers to detain outside of the traditional rules of the Fourth Amendment,” 
its reach must be carefully circumscribed.”) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 
1042 (2013)).)  
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The State instead argues that the detention here was lawful because it was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.  (Resp. Br., pp.9–13.)  Mr. Williams disagrees.  First, the arrest 
warrant here, unlike a search warrant, adds nothing to the analysis.  See Summers, 452 U.S. at 
701–04 (“Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a 
warrant to search respondent’s house for contraband. . . .  The connection of an occupant to that 
home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that 
suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant.”); see also App. Br., pp.10–
11.  Rather, the primary justification for Mr. Williams’ detention was officer safety.  (See 
Tr., p.20, L.16 – p.21, L.6; Resp. Br., pp.11–12.)   Yet the officers had no specific, articulable 
reason to believe Mr. Bellenbrock1 or any of the other individuals had violent histories, had 
weapons, or otherwise posed a danger.  (See Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.21, L.6 (Officer Theuson 
explaining that the officers did not know whether Mr. Bellenbrock “would reenter the residence, 
access weapons.  These three people that were with them, we didn’t know who they were; if we 
left them, if they would have assisted him in trying to avoid being captured, if they were 
armed.”).)  Mr. Williams acknowledges that, even absent specific evidence of danger, the 
officers had a legitimate interest in securing their safety and thus could have stopped 
Mr. Williams from going back into the apartment or toward where Mr. Bellenbrock fled.  
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03.  He contends, however, that the interest in officer safety could 
have just as easily been met by allowing him to leave the scene.  Therefore, it was not reasonable 
for the officers to detain Mr. Williams while they arrested Mr. Bellenbrock.   
 
                                            
1 Mr. Bellenbrock had a warrant out for contempt after he failed to appear for drug court.  
(State’s Ex. 1, p.2.)  That exhibit also appears to contain Mr. Bellenbrock’s criminal history, 
which consists of non-violent misdemeanor offenses and felony driving under the influence.  
(State’s Ex. 1, pp.2–3.)   
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CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.   
 DATED this 11th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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